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     ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses factors which have prompted the need for further revision of banking 
regulation, with particular reference to the Capital Requirements Directive. The Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD), which comprises the 2006/48/EC Directive on the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and the 2006/49/EC Directive on the capital 
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, implemented the revised framework for 
the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II) 
within EU member states.  
 
Pro cyclicality has attracted a lot of attention – particularly with regards to the recent 
financial crisis, owing to concerns arising from increased sensitivity to credit risk under 
Basel II. This paper not only considers whether such concerns are well-founded, but also the 
beneficial and not so beneficial consequences emanating from Basel II’s increased sensitivity 
to credit risk (as illustrated by the Internal Ratings Based approaches). In so doing it 
considers the effects of Pillar 2 of Basel II, namely, supervisory review, with particular 
reference to buffer levels, and whether banks’ actual capital ratios can be expected to 
correspond with Basel capital requirements given the fact that they are expected to hold 
certain capital buffers under Pillar 2. Furthermore, it considers how regulators can respond 
to prevent systemic risks to the financial system during periods when firms which are highly 
leveraged become reluctant to lend. In deciding to cut back on lending activities, are the 
decisions of such firms justified in situations where such firms’ credit risk models are 
extremely and unduly sensitive - hence the level of capital being retained is actually much 
higher than minimum regulatory Basel capital requirements ?  
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Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directive: Responding to the 2008/09 
Financial Crisis 
     Marianne Ojo1 
 
Introduction 
A recurring theme which has featured amongst the reasons attributed to the need for 
amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive, is the mitigation of pro cyclicality. 
Efforts aimed at addressing pro cyclicality, as stated in the Accompanying Document to the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament2 focus on areas such as systemically 
relevant matters, bank regulation and remuneration.3 Bank regulation, namely, Basel II and 
the Capital Requirements Directive, will constitute the focus of this study. The paper 
commences with a discussion on developments which have taken place within the legislative 
framework for capital requirements, embracing events leading up to the adoption and 
implementation of the CRD. It then follows with a section which considers why further 
revisions to bank regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive in particular, have 
become necessary. In so doing, it makes reference to lessons drawn from the recent financial 
crises and areas in need of greater attention, as identified by the High Level Group on 
Supervision, and measures put forward to address these problems. 
The paper then considers developments which have taken place under Basel II and factors 
which have prompted the need for such developments, with particular reference to the need 
for increased sensitivity to credit risk. Basel II’s efforts to increase sensitivity to credit risk, 
whilst having been lauded, has also drawn criticisms and concerns – particularly with regards 
to one topic, namely, pro cyclicality. Such concerns will be addressed having regard to 
safeguards which are in place within the CRD and Basel II, and which have been established 
as means of mitigating pro cyclicality. Other proposals put forward by the High Level Group 
on Supervision in their report will also be considered before a conclusion is arrived at. 
Work undertaken on legislative framework for capital requirements 
As part of necessary measures aimed at aligning the legislation on capital framework [for 
credit institutions (banks) and investment firms] with developments in the market, and with 
the work of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the Consolidated Banking 
Directive 2000/12/EC and the Capital Adequacy Directive 93/6/EEC, whose legal bases are 
linked to that of the Basel 1 Accord and the Basel market risk amendments of 1996, were 
reviewed and updated with final proposals for the Basel II framework (in June 2004) and the 
Trading Book Review (in July 2005).4 The resulting Basel agreement, adopted in June 2006 
                                                 
1 Research Fellow, Center For European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen 
2 And of the Council, amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitization issues and 
remuneration policies 
3 See ‘Commission proposes further revision of banking regulation to strengthen rules on bank capital and on 
remuneration in the banking sector’ see < http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1120> 
4 See Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, Impact Assessment 
Document  at page 4 < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/impact_assessment_en.pdf> 
 3
as the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), comprises the 2006/48/EC Directive5 and the 
2006/49/EC Directive6. 
In implementing the revised framework for the International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II) within EU member states, the Capital 
Requirements Directive underwent a two stage procedure. Under the first part of the two stage 
procedure of implementing the CRD on a national basis, the majority of the rules entered into 
force on the 1 January 2007 (whereby it could be adopted at an earlier period during 2007 and 
fully adopted on 1 Jan 2008) whilst the remaining rules were to take effect on 1 Jan 2008.7  
Even though the Capital Requirements Directive was fully implemented on the 1 January 
2008, certain areas were “left open” at the time it was adopted in 2006 – with the intention 
that such areas, through further policy measures, would be accorded due consideration.8 
Revisions which relate to such “left open” areas at the time of the CRD adoption comprise:9  
- Either revisions of rules that were brought forward from previous directives 
- Principles and rules that had not been formalised at EU level 
In addition to the afore mentioned “left open” areas which are to constitute the subject of 
future amendments, other reasons which justify the need for amendments within the Capital 
Requirements Directive arise from: Inconsistencies which, having been identified during the 
CRD transposition phase, required redress to prevent the goals of the CRD from being 
undermined; and the amendments of other areas whose flaws were revealed during the recent 
financial crisis.10 
 
Objectives aimed at ensuring that the effectiveness of the Capital Requirements Directive is 
not undermined include:11 The enhancement of financial stability, safeguarding creditor 
interests, ensuring international competitiveness of the EU banking sector and further 
promotion of the integration of the internal banking market. Operational objectives which are 
aimed at resolving drivers of specific problems include : The enhancement of legal certainty, 
the enhancement of supervisory cooperation, the enhancement of a level playing field, 
reduction of compliance burden and the facilitation of cross sector convergence, and the 
objective that these operational objectives, in turn, will facilitate the realisation of the four 
stated general policy objectives.12 
 
                                                 
5 On the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
6 On the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions 
7 See K McCaw and J Walsh ‘Basel II Big Bang: Full Implementation of the CRD’ http://www.gtnews.com 
Whilst firms were required to implement the Pillar 1 approaches (approaches to measuring credit, market and 
operational risks) by the 1 January 2008, this also represented the earliest date for filing for an application of the 
use of the advanced measurement approaches to measuring both credit and operational risk 
8 See Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, Impact Assessment 
at page 5 
9 ibid 
10 ibid  
11 ibid at page 20 
12 ibid 
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Further revision of banking regulation to strengthen rules on bank capital and on remuneration 
in the banking sector, as proposed by the Commission 
Further proposed amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive, as adopted by the 
Commisssion, are not only aimed at capital requirements for the trading book and re 
securitisations, but also the disclosure of securitisation exposures and remuneration policies.13 
Further revisions to European capital regulation of banks were proposed in order to prevent 
the re -occurrence of recent and present financial problems, to manage risks associated with 
financial instability and pro cyclicality in a more effective way.14 Efforts aimed at addressing 
pro cyclicality focus particularly on the following areas:15 Systemically relevant matters , 
bank regulation and remuneration. 
 
Source :16 
                                                 
13 See ‘Commission proposes further revision of banking regulation to strengthen rules on bank capital and on 
remuneration in the banking sector’ see < http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1120> 
(last visited 10 September 2009) 
14 See Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of  the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, 
securitization issues and remuneration policies at page 3 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> 
15 ibid at pages 45-47 
16 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of  the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, 
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According to the Report of the High Level Group on Supervision, focus should be placed on 
principal sources of flaws in the current financial regulatory design – with such focus 
addressing issues relating to financial bubbles, consolidation of the regulatory oversight of 
institutions whose regulation has been demonstrated to be insufficient, addressing practices 
which are both regulatory and related to accounting – which have exacerbated pro cyclicality, 
facilitating proper incentives for good governance and transparency, implementing 
appropriate safeguards which are aimed at ensuring consistency in standards and rules, as well 
as greater coordination between regulators and supervisors, internationally.17  Furthermore, 
practices which facilitate over regulation should be discouraged since such practices would 
weaken economic growth on a wider basis, by acting as sources of impediment to financial 
innovation.18 
 
The Need for Greater Emphasis on Macro Prudential Aspects and Systemic Risk 
 
The significance of macro economic policies and their relationship to regulatory policies has 
been identified in the High Level Group’s Report where it attributes “ample liquidity and 
related low interest conditions” as factors which not only contributed to high levels of risk 
taking by banks and other financial institutions, but eventually led to the crisis.19 
Some lessons from the crisis as identified by the High Level Group on Supervision are as 
follows:20 
 
 
 Early warning signal mechanisms not effective enough 
 Excessive focus by current EU supervisory arrangements on micro supervision – at the 
expense of macro supervision 
 Competence problems 
 Lack of cooperation between supervisors 
 
Addressing inadequate macro prudential supervision and ineffectiveness of early risk warning 
systems 
 
In view of current EU supervisory arrangements which under estimate macro prudential 
aspects of supervision, and having regard to the fact that macro prudential supervision is 
carried out by different fragmented bodies at various levels, without any mechanism to 
guarantee the implementation of macro prudential risk warnings or recommendations, the 
Commission is to recommend that the ESRC be reorganised as a new independent body, 
designated with the task of safeguarding financial stability through its oversight of macro 
prudential supervision at European level.21  
                                                                                                                                                        
securitization issues and remuneration policies at 8 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> 
17 Report of High Level Group on Supervision  at pages 13,14 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
20 ibid at pages 39,40 
21 See European Financial Supervision: European Systemic Risk Council – Role and responsibilities of the 
ESRC at page 5. Furthermore, the ESRC is to be assigned with the following responsibilities: 
- collecting and analysing all information relevant for monitoring and assessing potential threats to 
financial stability which arise from macro economic developments and developments within the 
financial system as a whole 
- identifying and prioritising such risks 
- issuing risk warnings where risks appear to be significant 
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Source: Report by the High Level Group on Supervision 22 
 
 
Addressing Basel II  
 
Efforts culminating in the revised framework for the International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel 2) were aimed at addressing capital arbitrage and 
increasing sensitivity to risk – features which were not present under the 1988 Basel Accord. 
A prominent goal during the negotiations culminating in the Basel II agreement was resolving 
the problems attributed to the “failure to distinguish between commercial loans of very 
different degrees of credit risk”. 23 This gap was exploited as a means of transferring low-risk 
items off-balance sheet whilst retaining those items considered to present a relatively high 
level of risk.24 “Financial innovations” resulting from the weakness of the 1988 Accord, it is 
argued, furnished banks with the means of “arbitraging differences between regulatory and 
economic capital.”25 Even though, it is further argued, that such arbitrage practices have 
contributed in the minimisation of “allocative inefficiency”26, from a regulatory point of view, 
                                                                                                                                                        
- giving recommendations where necessary – in relation to measures which are to be taken in response to 
identified risks 
- monitoring required follow up to warnings and recommendations, and 
- liasing with the IMF, FSB and other counterparts. 
22Report of High Level Group on Supervision at page 57 
 
23 See M Gordy and B Howells ‘Pro cyclicality in Basel II: Can We Treat the Disease Without Killing the 
Patient?” 2004 at page 1<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf04gordy_howells.pdf >(last visited 14 September 
2009) 
24 ibid 
25 ibid; also see D Jones, ‘Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and 
Related Issues’ Journal of Banking and Finance 2000 24 (1-2) at pages 35-58 
26 It is contended that if banks had not been able to “circumvent” the 1988 Accord, that they would have been 
placed at a competitively disadvantageous position in their dealings with non bank lenders; see ibid  
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regulatory arbitrage has weakened the potential of the 1988 Accord.27 Under Pillar One, the 
objective is to align regulatory capital requirements with “economic capital” required by 
investors and other associated parties.28 
 
Under Basel 2, unlike the original capital Accord, capital charges are determined in 
accordance with asset quality – as opposed to asset type.29  The Internal Ratings Based 
approach to capital requirements for credit risk not only relies significantly on the internal 
assessment carried out by a bank in relation to counter parties and exposures, but is geared 
towards the achievement of two primary goals.30 These are namely, “additional risk 
sensitivity” and “incentive compatibility.”31 As a result, the benefits which Basel 2 exhibits, 
when compared to the 1988 Accord, relate to the fact that there should be a reduction in 
pricing distortions which may arise across loan categories – owing to risk based capital 
requirements; and that, incentives to participate in forms of regulatory capital arbitrage should 
correspondingly be reduced.32 However, concerns which have been raised in relation to Basel 
II include, amongst other issues, the increased sensitivity to credit risk. This is attributed to 
the fact that banks would be compelled to maintain higher levels of capital against present 
loan portfolio in cases where such banks’ capital bases are being depleted by losses arising 
from its loans and where its existing ‘non defaulted’ borrowers have to be ‘downgraded’ by 
appropriate credit risk models.33 Furthermore, banks may also be compelled to restrict the 
level of loan lending activities where such banks not only find it costly, but also experience 
difficulties in raising additional capital from external sources during periods of economic 
downturns – hence further aggravating the extent of the downturn.34 Whilst Heid also argues 
that the cyclical effects induced by Basel 2 could generate problems in situations where write 
offs in banks’ loans portfolios lead to the depletion of equity capital, hence triggering an 
increase in capital charges in periods of economic downturns, he adds that the consequences 
of a reduction in the lending activities of capital restricted banks, on the economy, could be 
even more draconian.35 Thus, the alignment of regulatory capital with economic risks, as 
evidenced under Basel 2;whilst reducing the scope for regulatory arbitrage practices, also has 
the potential to induce cyclical effects on the required minimum capital – through its ability to 
increase the sensitivity to credit risk.36 With the Internal Ratings Based approach, credit risk 
is estimated in relation to four elements namely: The probability of default (PD), loss given 
default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD); and maturity (M).37 
 
 
                                                 
27 See M Gordy and B Howells ‘Pro cyclicality in Basel II: Can We Treat the Disease Without Killing the 
Patient?” 2004 at page 1and D Jones, ‘Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital 
Arbitrage and Related Issues’ Journal of Banking and Finance 2000 24 (1-2) at pages 35-58 
28 ibid 
29 See F Heid, ‘Cyclical Effects of the Basel II Capital Requirements’ Journal of Banking and Finance Vol 31 
Issue 12 2007 at pages 3885-3900 
30 ‘The Internal Ratings Based Approach’, Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord 2001 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf (last visited 3 August 2009) at page 1  
31 With respect to „incentive compatibility“, a well- structured IRB approach could stimulate banks to improve 
their internal management practices on a continual basis. ibid 
32 Also see A Kashyap and J Stein ‘Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Standards 2003 at page 1 
33 ibid at page 2 
34 ibid 
35 See F Heid, ‘Cyclical Effects of the Basel II Capital Requirements’ Journal of Banking and Finance Vol 31 
Issue 12 2007 at pages 3885 and 3886 
36 ibid at pages 3885-3900 
37 See A Kashyap and J Stein ‘Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Standards 2003 at page 1 
37 ibid at page 1 
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Measures provided for mitigating the effects of pro cyclicality under the Capital 
Requirements Directive and Pillar Two of Basel II (Supervisory Review). 
 
The CRD’s potential to generate further pro cyclicality as a result of greater risk sensitivity 
induced by its capital requirements, had been anticipated during its design.38 In providing for 
the possibility of such an occurrence, the CRD incorporates specific elements aimed at 
alleviating these effects, through the application of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) 
estimates, PD estimates being based on long data series, technical adjustments made to the 
risk weight function, stress testing requirements and Pillar 2 supervisory review process.39 
However, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), in its report which addresses pro cyclicality in 
the financial system, lists four recommendations which acknowledge and confirm the need for 
further measures aimed at mitigating the effects of pro cyclicality within the capital 
requirements framework.40 
 
Its recommendations embrace a variety of options ranging from a reduction of cyclical risk 
sensitivity to enhancing its risk capture and deliberately introducing counter-cyclical buffers 
which are comprised of capital and/or provisions and cover three areas, namely: bank capital 
framework, bank loan loss provisions and leverage and valuation issues.41 
 
Pillar Two consists of four principles, namely:42 
 
- Principle 1: Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy 
in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
- Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their 
compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate 
supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process. 
- Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory 
capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of 
the minimum. 
- Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital 
from falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a 
particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or 
restored. 
 
Even though the ability of supervisors to exercise discretionary powers under Pillar Two, is 
considered to be a means of mitigating the effects of pro cyclicality,43 Principles 3 and 4, 
through the stipulation of undetermined and indefinite buffer levels, can be argued to 
introduce an element of uncertainty in failing to stipulate precisely the required buffer levels. 
                                                 
38 See Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of  the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, 
securitization issues and remuneration policies < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> (last visited 10 
September 2009) at page 45 
39 ibid 
40 ibid 
41 ibid 
42 See ‘Four Key Principles of Supervisory Review’ < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107c.pdf> at pages 159 -165 
43 Gordy and Howells argue that as a result of the powers granted to supervisors under  Pillar Two, such powers 
could serve to address pro cyclicality. See M Gordy and B Howells, ‘Procyclicality in Basel II: Can We Treat 
The Disease Without Killing the Patient?’ 2004 at page 3 
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Such element of judgement which is accorded to supervisors could result in situations where 
supervised institutions actually retain an excessive amount of capital than is required under 
Basel II – as was evidenced by Northern Rock on the day before its crash.  
 
 
Other regulatory weaknesses identified by the High Level Group on Supervision which 
require urgent attention  
 
The High Level Group’s Report acknowledged the need to address and revamp the Basel 2 
framework.44 As well as identifying the under estimation of some significant risks by Basel 
II’s framework, and its over estimation of banks’ ability to deal with such risks, it highlighted 
the inaccuracy (on a global basis), of the “perceived wisdom that distribution of risks through 
securitisation took risks away from the banks.”45 Such inaccuracy in its view, resulted 
insufficient capital requirements being imposed.46  
 
 
Matters relating to liquidity were also considered to be vital – having regards to individual 
financial firms and the regulatory system.47 In the opinion of the High Level Group, greater 
attention should be given by supervisors to areas involving mismatches of firms being 
supervised. The extent to which the maturity of funding determines the risk of an asset is an 
important lesson from the recent financial crises.48 A reason which was attributed to Northern 
Rock’s vulnerability was its excessive reliance on wholesale funds.49  
 
Conclusion 
 
Whilst it is contended that under Basel 1, based on research evidence, capital buffers increase 
during economic downturns and decrease during economic booms, and that increased risk 
sensitivity of Basel 2 would amplify sensitivity of capital charges, it has been demonstrated, 
in contrast to other studies, that a significant degree of pro cyclicality may still exist even if 
banks were not restricted by capital.50 Furthermore , it is also argued that capital buffers will 
only diminish the volatility of capital charges to an extent, and that on the whole, Basel 2 will 
have a pro cyclical effect on lending.51 
 
The vulnerability of highly leveraged firms in times of economic downturns was 
demonstrated by Northern Rock.52 As well as introducing counter cyclical mechanisms( 
whose measures are tough during credit booms and relaxed during economic downturns), 
                                                 
44 Report of High Level Group on Supervision page 16 
45 ibid 
46 ibid 
47 See paragraph 55 of the Report of the High Level Group on Supervision at page 16 
48 See M Brunnermeier and others, ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on the 
World Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at viii 
49 S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ Chart 3 
http://www.ideas.repec.org/a/fip/feddel/y2009iaprnv.4no.3.html (last visited 25 May 2009) 
50 See F Heid, ‘Cyclical Effects of the Basel II Capital Requirements’ Journal of Banking and Finance Vol 31 
Issue 12 2007 at pages 3885- 3889 
51 ibid 
52 For detailed information on this, see The Run on the Rock," House of Commons Treasury Committee, Fifth 
Report of Session 2007–08, vol. 1, January 2008, pp. 14–15, S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for 
Banking Regulation?’, M Brünnermeier et al, The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 32 and HS Shin, ‘Reflections on Northern 
Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the Global Financial Crisis’ forthcoming the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 
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Brünnermeier et al propose a tool which would empower regulators to compel the conversion 
of existing debt to equity during periods of economic crisis – hence mitigating systemic 
effects of the crisis.53 It is also added that resort should be had to such a tool only when the 
entire (or part of) economy is experiencing economic difficulties. In Heid’s opinion, in 
comparison to the 1988 Accord, a unique feature has been introduced by Basel II in the 
dynamism and the potential it accords to banks in enabling them to manage high levels of 
credit – through a transformation of their funds from loans to bonds.54 
 
As well as the consideration of counter cyclical mechanisms, measures aimed at addressing 
liquidity risks and special resolution regimes55 (as demonstrated in the case of Northern 
Rock) are assuming increasingly important roles. Liquidity risks and maturity mismatches 
featured prominently in the events culminating in the collapse of Northern Rock. Acco
to Brunnermeier et al, “the financial system’s reliance on short-term funding of long-term 
assets with potentially low market liquidity” has contributed significantly to instability in the
past and present financial crise 56
rding 
 
s.  
                                                
 
Other proposals aimed at countering the effects of pro cyclicality of fair value measurements 
include reclassifications, smoothing techniques and circuit breakers.57 
The fourth recommendation of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, 
which relates to accounting rules, considers “ a wider reflection on the mark-to-market 
principle” to be vital in addressing pro cyclical effects.58 The Report of the High Level Group 
on Supervision also emphasised the need to facilitate proper incentives for good governance 
and transparency, the implementation of adequate safeguards aimed at guaranteeing 
consistency in standards and rules, as well as greater coordination between regulators and 
supervisors internationally.  
 
One of the financial regulatory weaknesses identified in the recent financial crisis includes an 
underestimation of the impact of macro prudential regulation and systemic risks. As well as 
consolidating global arrangements for enhancing global financial stability through the G20’s 
establishment of the Financial Stability Board which will work closely with the International 
Monetary Fund to provide early warnings relating to macro prudential risk, the need for a 
body within the EU, which is specially designated for macro supervision within the EU 
financial services sector, has been identified as another vital factor to ensuring stability.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 M Brünnermeier et al, The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on the World 
Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 33 
54 See F Heid, ‘Cyclical Effects of the Basel II Capital Requirements’ Journal of Banking and Finance Vol 31 
Issue 12 2007 at pages 3889-3890 
55 Please refer to M Ojo, ‘Central Bank’s Role and Involvement in Bank Regulation: Lender of Last Resort 
Arrangements and the Special Resolution Regime (SRR)’ 2009 
56 The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11’, Preliminary 
Draft 2009at page 38 
57 See M Grande „Accounting and Procyclicality“, Conference on Financial Reporting in a Changing World, 
page 2 of 5  
58 The ‘Brief Summary of the De Larosiere Report’ at page 9 of 18  
59 See European Financial Supervision: European Systemic Risk Council – The case for reform of macro 
prudential supervision at page 4 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_may2009/C-
2009_715_en.pdf> 
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